Order Without Law
Cass R. Sunsteint

Under the leadership of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Supreme Court of the United States has generally been minimalist, in
the sense that it has attempted to say no more than is necessary to decide the case at hand, without venturing anything large or ambitious.'
To some extent, the Court's minimalism appears to have been a product of some of the justices' conception of the appropriately limited
role of the judiciary in American political life. To some extent, the
tendency toward minimalism has been a product of the simple need to

assemble a majority vote. If five or more votes are sought, the opinion
might well tend in the direction of minimalism, reflecting judgments
and commitments that can command agreement from diverse people.
To be sure, the Court has been willing, on occasion, to be extremely aggressive. In a number of cases, the Court has asserted its

own, highly contestable vision of the Constitution against the democratic process. This aggressive strand has been most evident in a set of
decisions involving federalism; it can be found elsewhere as well.' But
generally these decisions have been minimalist too. Notwithstanding
their aggressiveness, they tend to decide the case at hand, without

making many commitments for the future. Sometimes those decisions
have even been "subminimalist," in the sense that they have said less

than is required to justify the particular outcome. 4
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago. I am grateful to Richard Posner and Mary Anne Case
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Apologies for the title choice to Professor Robert C.
Ellickson. See his superb (and unrelated) Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
(Harvard 1991).
1 For a general discussion of judicial minimalism, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a
Time: JudicialMinimalism on the Supreme Court (Harvard 1999).
2
United States v Morrison,120 S Ct 1740,1759 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against
Women Act as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause); City of Boerne v
Flores,521 US 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded
Congress's remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v Lopez, 514 US
549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that the prohibition of firearm possession near schools was outside
the power of Congress).
3 Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas are fairly consistent maximalists, on the
ground that they favor rule-bound decisions. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175, 1178-86 (1989) (discussing reasons to prefer rules over judicial discretion).
4
See Romer v Evans, 517 US 620,635 (1996) (holding law forbidding special government
protections for homosexuals to be invalid under the Equal Protection Clause, without fully explaining its consistency with earlier decisions).
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In the Court's two decisions involving the 2000 presidential election, minimalism was on full display. The Court's unanimous decision
in Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board was firmly in the

minimalist camp. Here the Court refused to resolve the most fundamental issues and merely remanded to the Florida Supreme Court for
clarification. The Court's 5-4 decision in Bush v Gore' was also minimalist in its own way, for it purported to resolve the case without doing anything for the future. But here the Court effectively ended the
presidential election. It. did so with rulings, on the merits and (especially) on the question of remedy, that combined hubris with minimalism.
The Court's decision in Bush v Gore did have two fundamental
virtues. First, it produced a prompt and decisive conclusion to the chaotic post-election period of 2000. Indeed, it probably did so in a way
that carried more simplicity and authority than anything that might
have been expected from the United States Congress. The Court
might even have avoided a genuine constitutional crisis. Second, the
Court's equal protection holding carries considerable appeal. On its
face, that holding has the potential to create the most expansive, and
perhaps sensible, protection for voting rights since the Court's oneperson, one-vote decisions of mid-century.' In the fullness of time, that
promise might conceivably be realized within the federal courts, policing various inequalities with respect to voting and voting technology.
But it is far more likely that the Court's decision, alongside the evident problems in the Florida presidential vote, will help to spur corrective action from Congress and state legislatures.
The Court's decision also had two large vices. First, the Court effectively resolved the presidential election not unanimously, but by a
5-4 vote, with the majority consisting entirely of the Court's most conservative justices. Second, the Court's rationale was not only exceedingly ambitious but also embarrassingly weak. However appealing, its
equal protection holding had no basis in precedent or in history. It
also raises a host of puzzles for the future, which the Court appeared
to try to resolve with its minimalist cry of "here, but nowhere else." Far
more problematic, as a matter of law, was the majority's subminimalist
decision on the issue of remedy. By terminating the manual recount in
121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per curiam).
121 S Ct 525 (2000) (per curiam).
7
See Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533,568 (1964) (holding an apportionment decision violative of the Equal Protection Clause because of the different weight given to different votes);
Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 208-37 (1962) (holding state apportionment decision not to present
nonjusticiable political questions).
5
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Florida, the Court resolved what it acknowledged to be a question of
Florida law, without giving the Florida courts the chance to offer an
interpretation of their own state's law.
In a case of this degree of political salience, the Court should assure the nation, through its actions and its words, that it is speaking for
the law, and not for anything resembling partisan or parochial interests. A unanimous or near-unanimous decision can go a long way toward providing that assurance, because agreement between diverse
people suggests that the Court is really speaking for the law. So too for
an opinion that is based on reasoning that, whether or not unassailable, is so logical and clear as to dispel any doubt about the legitimacy
of the outcome. The Court offered no such opinion.
From the standpoint of constitutional order, the Court might well
have done the nation a service. From the standpoint of legal reasoning,
the Court's decision was very bad. In short, the Court's decision produced order without law.
I. PRELIMINARIES

Bush v Gore was actually the fourth intervention, by the United
States Supreme Court, in the litigation over the outcome of the presidential election in Florida. In sequence, the Court's interventions consisted of the surprising grant of certiorari on November 24, 2000;8 the
unanimous, minimalist remand on December 4, 2000;' the grant of a
stay, and certiorari, on December 9, 2000;1" and the decisive opinion in
Bush v Gore on December 12,2000.11
A. The Unanimous, Minimalist Remand
On November 13, Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris
announced that the statutory deadline of November 14, 2000, was final, and that she would not exercise her discretion so as to allow extensions. 2 On November 21, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted
state law to require the Secretary of State to extend the statutory
deadline for a manual recount." This was a highly controversial inter-

8

Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 510 (2000) (granting first writ of

certiorari).
9

Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471.

10 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 512 (2000).

11 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 525.
12 See Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d 1220,1225-26 (Fla Nov 21,
2000), vacd and remd as, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471.
13 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d at 1240.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[68:757

pretation of Florida law, and it might well have been wrong. At the
time, however, any errors seemed to raise issues of state rather than
federal law.
In seeking certiorari, Bush raised three federal challenges to the
decision of the Florida Supreme Court." First, he argued that by
changing state law, the Florida Court had violated Article II of the
United States Constitution, which provides that states shall appoint
electors "in such manner as the Legislature," and not any court, may
16
direct. Second, Bush invoked a federal law saying that a state's appointment of electors is "conclusive" if a state provides for the appointment of electors "by laws enacted prior to the day fixed" for the
election." According to Bush, the Florida court did not follow, but instead changed, the law "enacted prior" to Election Day, and in his
view this change amounted to a violation of federal law. 8 Third, Bush
argued that the manual recount would violate the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses, because no clear standards had been established to ensure that similarly situated people would be treated similarly."
At the time, most observers thought it exceedingly unlikely that
the Court would agree to hear the case. Even if the Florida Supreme
Court had effectively "changed" state law, it appeared improbable that
the United States Supreme Court could be convinced to say so. Whatever the merits, the Court seemed unlikely to intervene into a continuing controversy over the presidential vote in Florida. This was not
technically a "political question,""° but it did not seem to be the kind of
question that would warrant Supreme Court involvement, certainly
not at this preliminary stage. To the general surprise of most observers,
the Court agreed to grant certiorari, limited to the first two questions
raised by Bush.
Bush asked the United States Supreme Court to hold that because the Florida Supreme Court had violated the federal Constitu14

See, for example, Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-HalfCheersfor Bush v Gore, 68 U

Chi L Rev 657 (2001) (discussing how the state supreme court's decision that the law mandates
an extension is wrong); Richard A. Posner, Bush v Gore: Prolegomenon to an Assessment, 68 U
Chi L Rev 719 (2001) (same).
15 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bush v Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard, No 00-836
(filed Nov 22,2000) (available on Lexis at 2000 US Briefs 836).
16
Id at *18-20, citing US Const Art II § 1, cl 2.
17
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *12-18 (cited in note 15), citing 3 USC § 5 (1994).
18
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *12-18 (cited in note 15).
19
Id at *20-26.
20
For a discussion of what constitutes a nonjusticiable political question, see Baker v Carr,
369 US 186,208-37 (1962).
21
Bush v Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard, 121 S Ct 510 (2000) (granting certiorari).
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tion and federal law, Florida's Secretary of State had the authority to
certify the vote as of November 14. For his part, Gore wanted the
Court to affirm the Florida Supreme Court on the ground that that
court had merely interpreted the law.2 The United States Supreme
Court refused these invitations and took an exceptionally small step,
asking the state supreme court to clarify the basis for its decision.' Did
the state court use the Florida Constitution to override the will of the
Florida legislature? In the Court's view, that would be a serious problem, because the United States Constitution requires state legislatures,
not state constitutions, to determine the manner of appointing electors." The Supreme Court also asked the state court to address the
federal law requiring electors to be appointed under state law enacted
"prior to" Election Day.7 In its own opinion, the Florida Supreme
Court had said nothing about that law.
This was judicial minimalism in action. Why did the Court proceed in this way? It seems possible that some of the justices refused to
settle the merits on principle, thinking that the federal judiciary should
insert itself as little as possible into the continuing electoral struggle.
But the most likely explanation is that the Court sought unanimity
and found, as groups often do, that unanimity is possible only if as little as possible is decided.
B.

The Astonishing Stay

On December 8, the Florida Supreme Court ruled, by a vote of
4-3, that a manual recount was required by state law, and it thus accepted Gore's contest. 26 This decision threw the presidential election
into apparent disarray. With the manual recount beginning, it became
quite unclear whether Bush or Gore would emerge as the winner.
On December 9, the Supreme Court issued a stay of the decision
of the Florida Supreme Court. 7 This was the first genuinely extraordinary action taken by the United States Supreme Court. It was not only
extraordinary but also a departure from conventional practice, and
22 See Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr., and Florida Democratic Party, Bush v Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board, No 00-836, *13-21, 50 (filed Nov 28,2000) (available on Lexis
at 2000 US Briefs 836).
23 See Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct at 475 (remanding for further proceedings).
24 Id at 474.
25 Id.
26
Gore v Harris,772 S2d 1243, 1260-62 (Fla Dec 8,2000), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore,
121 S Ct 525.
27 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 512 (2000) (granting certiorari and staying the implementation of
the Florida Supreme Court's decision).
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one that is difficult to defend on conventional legal grounds-not because Bush lacked a substantial probability of success, but because he
had shown no irreparable harm.
To be sure, some harm would have come to Bush from the continuation of the manual recount. It is entirely possible that the recount
would have narrowed the gap between Bush and Gore. This would
have been an unquestionable harm to Bush, in the nontrivial sense
that it would have raised some questions about the legitimacy of his
ensuing presidency, if it had subsequently been determined that the
manual recount was unlawful." But the question remains: How serious
and irreparable would this "harm" have been? If the manual recount
was soon to be deemed unlawful, would the Bush presidency really
have been "irreparably" harmed? This is extremely doubtful.
At the same time, the stay of the manual recount would seem to
have worked an irreparable harm to Gore. For Gore, time was very
much of the essence, and if the counting was stopped, the difficulty of
completing it in the requisite period would become all the more serious. By itself, the Supreme Court's stay of the manual recount did not
hand the election to Bush. But it came very close to doing precisely
that.
In these circumstances, can anything be said on behalf of the
stay? A reasonable argument is available, at least in retrospect. Suppose that a majority of the Court was entirely convinced that the
manual recount was unlawful, perhaps because in the absence of uniform standards, similarly situated voters would not be treated similarly. If the judgment on the merits was clear, why should the voting be
allowed to continue, in light of the fact that it would undoubtedly have
to be stopped soon in any case, and its continuation in the interim
would work some harm to the legitimacy of the next president? The
question suggests that if the ultimate judgment on the merits was
clear, the stay would not be so hard to defend. If the likelihood of success is overwhelming, the plaintiff should not be required to make the
ordinary showing of irreparable harm.29 The problem, then, was less
the stay than the Court's ambitious, poorly reasoned judgment on the
merits.

28
29

1985).

As emphasized by Justice Scalia, see id at 512 (Scalia concurring).
Cuomo v United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 772 F2d 972, 974 (DC Cir
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II. ORDER AND LAW
A. Merits: What the Court Said
On the merits, there are two especially striking features to the
Court's decision. The first is that six justices were unwilling to accept
Bush's major submission, to the effect that the Florida Supreme Court
had produced an unacceptable change in Florida law." The second is
that five members of the Court accepted the adventurous equal protection argument.
The equal protection claim does have considerable appeal, at
least as a matter of common sense. If a vote is not counted in one area
when it would be counted in another, something certainly seems to be
amiss. Suppose, for example, that in one county, a vote will not count
unless the stylus goes all the way through, whereas in another country,
a vote counts merely because it contains a highly visible "dimple." If
this is the situation, some voters can legitimately object that they are
being treated unequally for no good reason.
In its per curiam opinion, the Court spelled out the equal protection rationale in some detail. "In some cases a piece of the card-a
chad -is hanging, say by two corners. In other cases there is no separation at all, just an indentation."'" The disparate treatment of these
markings in different counties was unnecessary, because the "search
for intent can be confined by specific rules designed to ensure uniform
treatment.". In Florida, that search was not so confined, for the record
suggested that in Miami-Dade County, different standards had been
applied in defining legal votes; and Palm Beach County appeared to
go so far as to change its standards during the process of counting. To
this, the Court added "further concerns."33 These included an absence
of specification of "who would recount the ballots," leading to a situation in which untrained members of "ad hoc teams" would be involved
in the process.4 And "while others were permitted to observe, they
were prohibited from objecting during the recount."3 Thus the Court
concluded that the recount process "isinconsistent with the minimum
30
I will not discuss that issue here. In brief, I think that the argument becomes less convincing the more one reflects on it. To be sure, a decision by a state court to disregard state law
would raise serious questions under Article II. And I do not believe that the Florida Supreme
Court correctly interpreted state law. But the majority's view was not so implausible as to
amount to a change, rather than an interpretation. See Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 543-45 (Souter
dissenting); id at 554 (Breyer dissenting).
31

Id at 530.

Id.
33 Id at 532.
34 Id.
35 Id.
32
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procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right of each voter in
the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a
single state judicial officer."'
The Court was well aware that its equal protection holding could
have explosive impiications for the future, throwing much of state
election law into constitutional doubt. Thus the Court emphasized the
limited nature of its ruling: "The question before the Court is not
whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop
different systems for implementing elections. Instead, we are presented with a situation where a state court with the power to assure
uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural
safeguards."37
Merits: Three Problems

B.

There are three problems with this reasoning. First, the Court's
decision lacked any basis in precedent. Second, the Court's effort to
cabin the reach of its decision seemed ad hoc and unprincipled-a
common risk with minimalism. And third, the system that the Court
let stand seemed at least as problematic, from the standpoint of equal
protection, as the system that the Court held invalid.
1. Precedent.
Nothing in the Court's previous decisions suggested that constitutional questions would be raised by this kind of inequality. The cases
that the Court invoked on behalf of the equal protection holdingmostly involving one-person, one-vote and the poll tax' -were entirely far afield. To be sure, the absence of precedential support is not
decisive; perhaps the problem had simply never arisen. But manual
recounts are far from uncommon, and no one had ever thought that
the Constitution requires that they be administered under clear and
specific standards.
To make the problem more vivid, suppose that in 1998, a candidate for statewide office-say, the position of attorney general-lost

after a manual recount, and brought a constitutional challenge on
equal protection grounds, claiming that county standards for counting
votes were unjustifiably variable. Is there any chance that the disappointed candidate would succeed in federal court? In all likelihood
36

37
38

Id.

Id.
Harperv Virginia Board of Elections, 383 US 663,666 (1966); Reynolds v Sims, 377 US
533,568 (1964).
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the constitutional objection would fail; in most courts, it would not
even be taken seriously. The rationale would be predictable, going
roughly like this: "No previous decision of any court supports the view
that the Constitution requires uniformity in methods for ascertaining
the will of the voter. There is no violation here of the principle of oneperson, one-vote. Nor is there any sign of discrimination against poor
people or members of any identifiable group. There is no demonstration of fraud or favoritism or self-dealing. In the absence of such evidence, varying local standards, chosen reasonably and in good faith by
local officials, do not give rise to a violation of the federal Constitution. In addition, a finding of an equal protection violation would entangle federal courts in what has, for many decades, been seen as a
matter for state and local government."
Of course it is possible to think that this equal protection holding
would be wrong. Whether the federal Constitution should be read to
cabin local discretion in this way is a difficult question. The problem is
that in a case of such great public visibility, the Court embraced the
principle with no support in precedent, with little consideration of implications, and as a kind of bolt from the blue.
2. Reach.
It is not at all clear how the rationale of Bush v Gore can be cabined in the way that the Court sought to do. What is missing from the
opinion is an explanation of why the situation in the case is distinctive,
and hence to be treated differently from countless apparently similar
situations involving equal protection problems. The effort to cabin the
outcome, without a sense of the principle to justify the cabining, gives
the opinion an unprincipled cast.
Suppose, for example, that a particular area in a state has an old
technology, one that misses an unusually high percentage of intended
votes. Suppose that many areas in that state have new technology, capable of detecting a far higher percentage of votes. Suppose that voters in that area urge that the Equal Protection Clause is violated by
the absence of uniformity in technology. Why doesn't Bush v Gore
make that claim quite plausible? Perhaps it can be urged that budget39 One of the real oddities of the majority opinion is that it was joined by two JusticesScalia and Thomas-who have insisted in their commitment to "originalism" as a method of constitutional interpretation. There is no reason to think that by adopting the Equal Protection
Clause, the nation thought that it was requiring clear and specific standards in the context of
manual recounts in statewide elections. In fact it is controversial to say that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to voting at all. The failure of Justices Scalia and Thomas to suggest the
relevance of originalism, their preferred method, raises many puzzles.
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ary considerations, combined with unobjectionable and longstanding
rules of local autonomy, make such disparities legitimate. In the context of a statewide recount administered by a single judge -the situation in Bush v Gore-these considerations appear less relevant. But it
is easy to imagine cases in which those considerations do not seem
weighty. I will return to these questions below.
3. Arbitrariness on all sides.
The system that the recount was designed to correct might well
have been as arbitrary as the manual recount that the Court struck
down-and hence the Court's decision might well have created an
even more severe problem of inequality. Consider the multiple inequalities in the certified vote. Under that vote, some machines counted
votes that were left uncounted by other machines, simply because of
different technology. Where optical scan ballots were used, for example, voters were far more likely to have their votes counted than
where punchcard ballots were used. In Florida, fifteen of every one
thousand punchcard ballots showed no presidential vote, whereas only
three of every optically scanned ballot showed no such vote.4 These
disparities might have been reduced with a manual recount. If the
broad principle of Bush v Gore is correct, manual recounts might even
seem constitutionally compelled. But the Court's decision, forbidding
manual recounts, ensured that the relevant inequalities would not be
corrected.
Nor were the machine recounts free from inequality. Some counties merely checked the arithmetic; others put ballots through a tabulating machine. The result is a significant difference in the effect of the
machine recount. If the constitutional problem consists of the different treatment of the similarly situated, then it seems entirely possible
that the manual recount, under the admittedly vague "intent of the
voter" standard, would have made things better rather than worse and that the decision of the United States Supreme Court aggravated
the problem of unjustified inequality.
4. Overall evaluation.
On the merits, then, the most reasonable conclusion is not that
the Court's decision was senseless-it was not- but that it lacked support in precedent or history, that it raised many unaddressed issues
with respect to scope, and that it might well have authorized equality

40

Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 552.
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problems as serious as those that it prevented. In these ways, the majority's opinion has some of the most severe vices of judicial minimalism. In fact this was a subminimalist opinion, giving the appearance of
having been built for the specific occasion.
C.

Remedy

Now turn to the Court's decision on the issue of remedy. If the
manual recount would be unconstitutional without clear standards,
what is the appropriate federal response? Should the manual recount
be terminated, or should it be continued with clear standards? At first
glance, that would appear to be a question of Florida law. If the Florida legislature would want manual recounts to continue, at the expense of losing the federal safe harbor, then manual recounts should
continue. If the Florida legislature would want manual recounts to
stop, in order to preserve the safe harbor, then manual recounts
should stop.
Why did the Supreme Court nonetheless halt the manual recount? The simple answer is that the Court thought it clear that the
Florida Supreme Court would interpret Florida law so as to halt the
process. As the Court wrote,
The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended the State's electors to 'participate[ ] fully in the federal
electoral process .... Because it is evident that any recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be unconstitutional for the
reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida ordering a recount to proceed.
Thus the Court concluded that as a matter of Florida law, a continuation of the manual recount "could not be part of an 'appropriate'
order authorized by" Florida law.
This was a blunder. It is true that the Florida Supreme Court had
emphasized the importance, for the Florida legislature, of the safe
harbor provision. But the Florida courts had never been asked to say
whether they would interpret Florida law to require a cessation in the
counting of votes, if the consequence of the counting would be to extend the choice of electors past December 12. In fact the Florida
Court's pervasive emphasis on the need to ensure the inclusion of law-

Id at 533.
Id.
43 Gore v Harris,772 S2d 1243, 1248 (Fla Dec 8,2000), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore, 121
S Ct 525.
41
42
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ful votes" would seem to indicate that if a choice must be made between the safe harbor and the inclusion of votes, the latter might have
priority. It is not easy to explain the United States Supreme Court's
failure to allow the Florida Supreme Court to consider this issue of
Florida law.
Here, then, is the part of the United States Supreme Court's opinion that is most difficult to defend on conventional legal grounds.
III. ALTERNATE HISTORY: WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED

Might anything unconventional help to defend the Court's conclusion? I have suggested that the Court's decision produced order. In
fact it might well have averted chaos. It is worthwhile to spend some
time on this question, because it provides the best explanation of the
Court's otherwise inexplicable approach.
Let us briefly imagine what would have happened if the Court
had affirmed the Florida Supreme Court, or remanded for continued
counting under a constitutionally adequate standard. In the event of
an affirmance, manual counting would of course have continued. In
the event of a remand, the Florida Supreme Court would have had to
sort out the relationship between the legislature's desire to preserve
the safe harbor and its desire to ensure an accurate count. That Court
had been divided 4-3 on the question whether a manual recount
should be required at all. It is reasonable to speculate that the three
dissenters would continue to object to the manual recount. The question is whether any of the four members of the majority would conclude that the December 12 deadline took precedence over the continuation of the contest. There is certainly a chance that the Florida
Supreme Court would have terminated the election at that point. But
if it failed to do so, things would have gotten extremely messy.
Almost certainly, the Republican-dominated Florida legislature
would have promptly sent a slate of electors, thus producing two
(identical) slates for Bush-the November 26 certification and the legislatively specified choice. The legislative slate would in turn have
been certified by the Secretary of State and the Governor of Florida.
In the meantime the counting would, by hypothesis, have continued,
well after the expiration of the December 12 safe harbor date. If Bush
had won the manual recount, things would be very simple. But suppose Gore had won; what then? Would the Secretary of State have
voluntarily certified the new count? Would the Governor of Florida
have signed off on the certification? It is not at all clear that Florida's
44

Gore v Harris,772 S2d at 1256-57.
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executive officials would do what the Florida courts wanted them to
do. And if the Secretary of State and the Governor refused, how
would the Florida courts have responded? Would they have threatened executive officials with contempt? How would they have responded to the threat? At the very least, there is a risk here of a minor
constitutional crisis within Florida itself.
Suppose that this problem had been solved-and that three certified votes from Florida had come before Congress. At that point, both
houses of Congress, acting separately, would have to vote on which
certification to accept.45 Almost certainly the Republican-dominated
House of Representatives would have accepted a Bush slate. The Senate, split 50-50, would be much harder to call; perhaps some Democrats, in conservative states won by Bush, would have agreed to accept
the Bush slate from Florida. But perhaps there would have been an
even division within the Senate. If so, Vice President Gore would have
been in a position to cast the deciding vote. Suppose that he did-and
that he voted for the third Florida slate, and thus for himself, so as to
ensure that the House and the Senate would come to different conclusions. At that point, the outcome is supposed to turn on the executive's
certification.' But which was that? Here the law provides no clear answers. At this point, a genuine constitutional crisis might have arisen.
It is not clear how it would have been settled. No doubt the nation
would have survived, but things would have gotten very messy.
The Court's decision made all of these issues academic. It averted
what would have been, at the very least, an intense partisan struggle,
lacking a solution that is likely to have been minimally acceptable to
all sides. I do not mean to suggest that the Supreme Court majority
was correct. The Court owes a duty of fidelity to the law. Pragmatic
concerns are certainly relevant in the face of ambiguous law, but there
is a reasonable argument that the Court abandoned the law simply
because of pragmatic concerns. What I hope to have shown is why the
Court might have done the nation a big favor.

IV. A LARGE NEW RIGHT?
For the future, the most important question involves the scope of
the right recognized in Bush v Gore. Notwithstanding the Court's efforts, that right is not at all easy to cabin, at least as a matter of basic
principle. On its face, the Court appears to have created the most expansive voting right in many decades.
45

46

See 3 USC § 15 (1994).
Id.
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A. A Minimalist Reading
At its narrowest, the Court has held that in the context of a
statewide recount proceeding overseen by a single judge, the standard
for counting votes must be (a) uniform and (b) concrete enough to
ensure that similarly situated people will be treated similarly. This
holding extends well beyond the context of presidential elections; it
applies to statewide offices, not just federal offices.
By itself this is a substantial renovation of current law, since over4
thirty states fail to specify concrete standards for manual recounts.
This does not mean that state legislatures must set down clear standards in advance; a decision by state judges should suffice. But the inevitable effect of the opinion will be to increase the pressure for legislative reform at the state and possibly even the national level. Any
state legislature would be well-advised to specify the standard by
which votes will be counted in the context of a manual recount. All
this should count, by itself, as a gain for sense and rationality in the recount process.
B.

Equality in Voting

It is hard to understand why the principle of Bush v Gore does
not extend much further than the case itself, at least in the context of
voting. Consider the following easily imaginable cases:
1. Poor counties have old machinery that successfully counts 97
percent of votes; wealthy counties have newer machinery that successfully counts 99 percent of votes. Those in poor counties mount a constitutional challenge, claiming that the difference in rejection rates is a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
2. Same as the immediately preceding case, except the division
does not involve poor and rich counties. It is simply the case that some
areas use machines that have a near-perfect counting rate, and others
do not. The distribution of machines seems quite random.
3. Ballots differ from county to county. Some counties use a version of the controversial "butterfly ballot"; most do not. It is clear that
where the butterfly ballot is used, an unusual number of voters are
confused, and do not successfully vote for the candidate of their
choice. Does this violate the Equal Protection Clause?
4. It is a national election. Citizens in Alabama use different machinery from that used by citizens in New York. The consequence is
that citizens in Alabama are far more likely to have their votes un47

See Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 540 n 2 (Stevens dissenting).
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counted than citizens in New York. Do they have a valid equal protection claim? What if the statistical disparity is very large?
The Bush Court's suggestion that ordinary voting raises "many
complexities" is correct;0 but how do those complexities justify unequal treatment in the cases just given? The best answer would point
to two practical points: budgetary considerations and the tradition of
local control. In light of these points, it might be difficult for some areas to have the same technology as others. Wealthy counties might
prefer to purchase more expensive machinery, whereas poorer communities might devote their limited resources to other problems. Perhaps judicial caution in the cases just given can be justified in this way.
But even if this is so, Bush v Gore plainly suggests the legitimacy of
both state and national action designed to combat disparities of this
kind. It is for this reason that the Court's decision, however narrowly
intended, set out a rationale that might well create an extremely important (and appealing) innovation in the law of voting rights. Perhaps
legislatures will respond to the invitation if courts refuse to do so.
C. A General Requirement of Rules?
In fact the Court's rationale might extend more broadly still. Outside of the context of voting, governments do not impose the most severe imaginable constraints on official discretion. Because discretion
exists, the similarly situated are treated differently.9 Perhaps the most
obvious example is the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for
criminal conviction, a standard that different juries will inevitably interpret in different ways. Is this unacceptable? 0
In the abstract, the question might seem fanciful; but analogous
constitutional challenges are hardly unfamiliar. In the 1960s and 1970s,
there was an effort to use the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses to try to ensure more rule-bound decisions, in such contexts as
licensing and admission to public housing.' Plaintiffs argued that
without clear criteria to discipline the exercise of discretion, there was
a risk that the similarly situated would not be treated similarly, and
that this risk was constitutionally unacceptable. But outside of the
Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 532.
This is the basic theme of Kenneth Culp Davis, DiscretionaryJustice: A PreliminaryInquiry (LSU 1969).
50 A possible answer is that no more rule-bound approach would be better, all things considered. This is a difference from Bush v Gore, where it was easy to imagine a rule-bound approach that would add constraints on discretion without sacrificing any important value.
51 Hornsby v Allen, 326 F2d 605,610 (5th Cir 1964); Holmes v New York City HousingAuthority, 398 F2d 262,264-65 (2d Cir 1968).
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most egregious settings, these efforts failed, 2 apparently on the theory
that rule-bound decisions produce arbitrariness of their own, and
courts are in a poor position to know whether rules are better than
discretionary judgments. Does Bush v Gore require courts to extend
the limited precedents here?
Perhaps it could be responded that because the choice between
rule-bound and more discretionary judgments is difficult in many
cases, judicial deference is generally appropriate-but not when fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, are at risk. If so, Bush v Gore
has a limited scope. But does this mean that methods must be in place
to ensure against differential treatment of those subject to capital
punishment? To life imprisonment? I cannot explore these questions
here. But for better or for worse, the rationale in Bush v Gore appears
to make it necessary to consider these issues anew.
CONCLUSION

If the Supreme Court is asked to intervene in an electoral controversy, especially a presidential election, it should try to avoid even
the slightest appearance that the justices are speaking for something
other than the law. Unanimity, or near-unanimity, can go a long way
toward providing the necessary assurance. Whether or not this is possible, the Court's opinion should be well-reasoned and rooted firmly
in the existing legal materials.
In Bush v Gore, the Court did not succeed on these counts. The
5-4 division was unfortunate enough; it was still worse that the fivemember majority consisted of the most conservative justices. Regrettably, the Court's opinion had no basis in precedent or history. To be
sure, the equal protection argument had a certain appeal in common
sense. But even if it were correct, the natural remedy would have been
to remand to the Florida Supreme Court, to ask that court to say
whether Florida law would favor the manual recount over the safe
harbor provision, or vice-versa. This remedy seems especially sensible
in light of the fact that the inequalities that the Court condemned
might well have been less serious than the inequalities that the recount would have corrected.
Nonetheless, there are two things to be said on behalf of the
Court's ruling. First, the Court brought a chaotic situation to an abrupt
end. From the standpoint of constitutional order, it is reasonable to
52
For examples of unsuccessful attempts to challenge unconditioned discretion violative of
equal protection in these contexts, see Phelps v Housing Authority of Woodruff, 742 F2d 816,
822-23 (4th Cir 1984); Atlanta Bowling Center,Inc v Allen, 389 F2d 713,715-17 (5th Cir 1968).

20011

Order Without Law

speculate that any other conclusion would have been far worse. In all
likelihood, the outcome would have been resolved in Congress, and
here political partisanship might well have spiraled out of control.
Second, the principle behind the equal protection ruling has considerable appeal. In a statewide recount, it is not easy to explain why votes
should count in one area when they would not count elsewhere. In fact
the principle has even more appeal if understood broadly, so as to forbid similarly situated voters from being treated differently because
their votes are being counted through different technologies. Understood in that broader way, the principle of Bush v Gore should bring a
range of questionable practices under fresh constitutional scrutiny.
Bush v Gore is likely to intensify public concern about unjustifiably aggressive decisions from the Supreme Court, and perhaps that
concern will give the Court an incentive to be more cautious about
unsupportable intrusions into the democratic arena. Far more important, Bush v Gore might come to stand for a principle, in legislatures if
not courts, that greatly outruns the Court's subminimalist holding -a
principle that calls for an end to the many unjustified disparities in
treatment in voting and perhaps beyond. It would be a nice irony if
the Court's weak and unprecedented opinion, properly condemned on
democratic grounds, led to significant social improvements from the
democratic point of view.
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